“The history of East Pakistan would have been different if some political Mir Zafar did not sabotage our causes” --- based on the heroic statement of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, evaluate the role of West Pakistani political elites in setting the plot of six-point movement in East Pakistan. Philosophically, what was the main aim of Sheikh Mujib’s six-point program? We will try to find that out in this article.
The six point development was a development in East Pakistan, led by Sheik Mujibur Rahman, which called for more prominent self-governance for East Pakistan. The development's fundamental plan was to understand the six requests set forward by an alliance of Bengali patriot ideological groups in 1966, to end the apparent misuse of East Pakistan by the West Pakistani rulers. It is viewed as an achievement headed straight toward Bangladesh's freedom.
Foundation:
Resistance pioneers in West Pakistan required a public meeting on February 6, 1966 to survey the pattern of post-Tashkent legislative issues. On February 4, Sheik Mujibur Rahman, alongside certain individuals from the Awami League, arrived at Lahore to go to the meeting. The following day on February 5, he set the Six Points before the subject advisory group and encouraged to remember the issue for the plan of following day's meeting. The proposition was dismissed and Sheik Mujibur Rahman was distinguished as a dissenter. On February 6, Mujib boycotted the gathering. On February 21, the Six Points proposition was put before the gathering of the functioning board of the Awami League and the proposition was acknowledged consistently.
The justification proposing the Six Points was to give the East more noteworthy self-governance in Pakistan. Following the parcel of India, the new province of Pakistan appeared. The occupants of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) made up most of its populace, and fares from East Pakistan (like jute) were a lion's share of Pakistan's fare pay. Nonetheless, East Pakistanis didn't feel they had a relative portion of political force and monetary advantages inside Pakistan.
East Pakistan was confronting a basic circumstance in the wake of being exposed to consistent segregation on a provincial premise, after a seemingly endless amount of time after year. Therefore, the financial analysts, scholarly people, and the government officials of East Pakistan began to bring up issues about this segregation, leading to the notable six-point development.
The six focuses are noted as being:
The Constitution ought to accommodate a Federation of Pakistan in its actual sense dependent on the Lahore Resolution, and the parliamentary type of government with matchless quality of a Legislature straightforwardly chose based on general grown-up establishment.
The government should manage just two subjects: Defense and Foreign Affairs, and any remaining lingering subjects ought to be vested in the uniting states.
Two discrete, however unreservedly convertible monetary standards for the two wings ought to be presented; or if this isn't doable, there ought to be one cash for the entire country, yet viable protected arrangements ought to be acquainted with prevent the trip of capital from East to West Pakistan. Moreover, a different Banking Reserve ought to be set up and separate financial and money related approach be received for East Pakistan.
The force of tax collection and income assortment ought to be vested in the unifying units and the government place would have no such force. The alliance would be qualified for an offer in the state charges to meet its consumptions.
There ought to be two separate records for the unfamiliar trade profit of the two wings; the unfamiliar trade prerequisites of the national government ought to be met by the two wings similarly or in a proportion to be fixed; native items should move liberated from obligation between the two wings, and the constitution ought to enable the units to build up exchange joins with outside nations.
East Pakistan ought to have a different military or paramilitary power, and Navy central command ought to be in East Pakistan.
THE memorable Six-Point Demand or the Six-Point Formula has been broadly credited as the "sanction of opportunity" in Bangladesh's battle for self-assurance from Pakistan's mastery. For sure, the six-point development in 1966 was the defining moment as we continued looking for freedom. On June 7 out of 1966 the Awami League called a countrywide hartal in the then East Pakistan to squeeze home the six-point requests. Sheik Mujibur Rahman alongside numerous others was captured. From that point forward seventh June is seen as the noteworthy six-point day.
Despite the conscious twists of our political history over a time of very nearly thirty years, the reality stays that the six-point development is an achievement throughout the entire existence of our battle for freedom.
The six-point plan had visualized an administrative type of government dependent on the 1940 Lahore Resolution, a parliamentary arrangement of government straightforwardly chose by individuals based on grown-up establishment, two separate monetary standards or two hold banks for the two wings of Pakistan, and a para-military power for East Pakistan.
The tremendous accomplishment of the six-point development in 1966 had incited the decision cadre of Pakistan to dishonor the coordinators of this development. In spite of the fact that Ayub Khan's fiendish system had utilized different merciless and reformatory measures against the defenders, coordinators and allies of the six-point equation, the six-point secured mass upsurge in 1966 had genuinely affected and adapted the ensuing political advancements in Pakistan.
The fundamental reason for this paper is to survey the importance and pertinence of the notable six-point development and its effect on Bangladesh's battle for autonomy. When the principle substance of six-point recipe are summed up, the nature, extent, and effect of the six-point development can be evaluated.
Responses of the political pioneers to the six-point plan and Sheik Mujibur Rahman's reaction
The standard political heads of the resistance groups in Pakistan were not in any event, willing to talk about the benefits or negative marks of the proposed six-point equation for guaranteeing more prominent common self-governance for the eastern region of Pakistan. Indeed, no West Pakistani political pioneer (not even Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan, the President of the then All-Pakistan Awami League) was able to loan any help to Sheik Mujibur Rahman's clarion call for greatest commonplace independence dependent on the proposed six-point recipe.
It is likewise truly shocking to review that, even after the slip by of 42 years, the non-Awami League delegates from the then East Pakistan didn't underwrite the six-point interest in that noteworthy meeting toward the beginning of February 1966. Like their West-Pakistani partners, East Pakistani political stalwarts had likewise smelled a component of "severance" or "crumbling" of Pakistan in the six-point recipe. Indeed, the six-point equation couldn't be pried out of the "topic advisory group" of that purported all-party gathering.
Rather than supporting or talking about the six-point equation, oneself proclaimed heroes of rebuilding of majority rules system in the then Pakistan had purposely dispatched a disgusting publicity crusade against Sheik Mujibur Rahman, the main support and advocate of the six-point plan. Without a doubt, the persuaded promulgation was basically portrayed by conspicuous deceptions, guesses, twists, and innuendoes. Truth be told, the six-point proposition got front facing assault even from the veteran Pakistani political stalwarts of a large portion of the ideological groups when they were clamoring for setting up unadulterated vote based system in Pakistan!
In her praised book, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (The University Press, 1994, pp. 139-140), Dr. Rounaq Jahan briefly summed up the unfriendly responses of other ideological groups to the six-point equation: "The six-point request split the Awami League as well as made it hard for the East Pakistan wing to shape a union with some other West Pakistan-based gathering. The CML (Council Muslim League) censured the six focuses as an interest for confederation, not organization; the Jama'at-I-Islami marked it as a nonconformist plan; the Nizam-I-Islam dismissed it as a one-sided, tyrannical proceed onward Mujib's part; and the NAP (National Awami Party) excused it in light of the fact that it was parochial and did exclude any actions to liberate East Pakistan from colonialists specialists." Yet, Sheik Mujibur Rahman would not be coerced or scared by the analysis of his six-point plan.
In an unrehearsed public interview in Lahore on February 10, 1966, Sheik Mujibur Rahman contended, as verified by Talukder Maniruzzaman in a fundamental article in 1967: "The subject of (commonplace) self-rule has all the earmarks of being more significant after the conflict (among India and Pakistan in September, 1965). The opportunity has arrived for making East Pakistan independent in all regards. He at that point articulated a 'six-point sanction of endurance' program for East Pakistan (Talukder Maniruzzaman, National Integration and Political Development in Pakistan, Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No.12, 1967, pp. 876-885)."
In that public interview, Sheik Mujibur Rahman had unmistakably said that since the proposed six-point request was not in any manner intended to hurt the commoners of West Pakistan, the topic of requesting an authentic "commonplace self-governance" for East Pakistan dependent on the six-point equation "ought not be confounded or excused as provincialism." He called attention to that the 17-day battle among Pakistan and India in September 1965 had made it completely clear toward the "East Pakistanis" that the safeguard of East Pakistan couldn't be dependent upon the benevolence or kindness of West Pakistan. He said that as opposed to depending on West Pakistan for its insurance, East Pakistan - a land found 1,000 miles away - ought to be made independent for shielding itself from outer hostility. He additionally made it completely clear that his six-point plan for "greatest" commonplace self-rule mirrored the long-standing requests of individuals of East Pakistan. He additionally brought up the futility and superfluity of the All-Party Conference.
On his re-visitation of Dhaka on February 11, 1966, Sheik Mujibur Rahman gave further explanation on his six-point equation in a question and answer session. He clarified why he hosted disassociated himself from the All-Get-together gathering in Lahore. He obviously expressed that the agents from East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL) had dismissed not just the proposition passed by the All-Party Conference yet additionally cut off all binds with the heads of the purported gathering of the resistance groups. He said that it was not in any manner workable for him or his gathering to 'sell out the veritable interests" of the bothered and denied individuals of East Pakistan.
He stressed that the quick reception and execution of his six-point recipe "will be helpful for cultivate tough connection between the two areas of Pakistan." In a public interview on February 14, 1966, he likewise rehashed what he had expressed in his Lahore question and answer session: that "the subject of independence has all the earmarks of being more significant for East Pakistan after the 17-day battle among Pakistan and India. Now is the ideal opportunity for making East Pakistan independent in all regards."
Response of the then domineering system to the six-point plan
Sheik Mujibur Rahman's interest for "most extreme self-governance" in view of his six-point recipe appears to have shaken the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The six-point plan had uncovered the way that the genuine goal of Pakistan's decision tip top was to "fortify" the focal government, yet not Pakistan. He over and again said in a few public gatherings that individuals of Pakistan had consistently wanted to have a "solid Pakistan," not a "solid focal government."
Nonetheless, the decision cadre of Pakistan was not in any manner keen on managing or haggling with the Awami League on the issue of commonplace self-rule despite the fact that Sheik Mujibur Rahman had openly expressed that he was able to arrange his six-point plan with anybody in compliance with common decency, given a significant independence was guaranteed for East Pakistan. The totalitarian leaders of Pakistan began utilizing abusive strategies to smother the six-point development. As verified by Dr. Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuyain, "the Ayub system's approach towards the six-point interest of the Awami League was one of complete concealment. It showed by and by that the system neglected to react to the political interest (Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuyain, Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1982, p. 104)."
Following the commonplace self-governance plan dependent on the six-point equation was revealed by Sheik Mujibur Rahman at the Lahore meeting of resistance ideological groups toward the beginning of February, 1966, Ayub Khan rushed to censure it as a rebel or secessionist move. Pointed toward frightening the devoted bosses of more prominent common self-governance, Ayub Khan had begun undermining both the message and the courier of the six-point program. Showing up in the last meeting of the Pakistan (Convention) Muslim League in Dacca on March 21, 1966, completely attired in the military general's khaki uniform with full presentation of the entirety of his formal attire and emblems, oneself proclaimed leader of Pakistan had denounced the six-point plan in the harshest potential terms.
Describing the six-point equation as an interest for "more noteworthy sovereign Bengal," he guaranteed that such an arrangement would put the "Bengali Muslims" under the control of "rank Hindus" of West Bengal. He had looked at the "overall circumstance" in Pakistan (as of March, 1966) with the unstable circumstance that had won in the USA before the episode of a delayed Civil War in the mid 1860s. He said that the country may need to confront a "common conflict" if such unstable circumstances were constrained upon him by the "secessionists" and "destructionists."
He had even compromised the claimed "autonomists" and "secessionists" with "critical outcomes" on the off chance that they neglected to disregard the possibility of commonplace self-sufficiency. Ayub Khan had likewise the daringness to compromise that the "language of weapons" would be mercilessly utilized for annihilating the "secessionist components from Pakistan."
Monem Khan, the scandalous legislative leader of East Pakistan, had freely expressed that "as long as I stay as the legislative leader of this region, I will make sure that Sheik Mujibur Rahman stays in chains." Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the ostentatious unfamiliar priest of Pakistan, had straightforwardly provoked Sheik Mujibur Rahman to a public discussion at Paltan Maidan in Dhaka on the qualities and shortcomings of the proposed six-point recipe. To the embarrassment of the Ayub system, Tajuddin Ahmed, the then number 2 innovator in Awami League, responded to the call for Sheik Mujibur Rahman. Shockingly, it was Z.A. Bhutto who didn't appear!
Sheik Mujibur Rahman dispatches the six-point development
A courageous Sheik Mujibur Rahman rushed to react to such unfounded indictments and awful dangers. In a mammoth public social affair at Paltan Maidan, he roared: "No measure of stripped dangers can divert the denied Bangalees from their interest for commonplace self-governance dependent on their six-point plan." Sheik Mujibur Rahman, the best boss of Bangalees' privileges for self-assurance, alongside top heads of the Awami League, continued tending to various public gatherings in the alcoves and corners of the then East Pakistan. The whole Awami League and the East Pakistan Students' League (EPSL), its understudy front, were intended for preparing and persuading the overall masses for self-government and self-sufficiency.
Sheik Mujibur Rahman had not just introduced the strong proposition for "most extreme independence" yet additionally dispatched a mass development (which he, at the end of the day, driven till he was placed in prison on May 9, 1966) for assembling mass help for the six-point program. He contributed the entirety of his energies and assets in scattering the central message, and articulating both the reasoning and the legitimization of "greatest self-rule" for East Pakistan.
In any case, prior to dispatching an undeniable mass development for understanding his six-focuses, Sheik Mujib hosted started some key intra-gathering measures. For instance, the functioning board of trustees of the gathering was rebuilt and redone in the notable Council Session of the East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL), that was hung on March 18-20, 1966. While Sheik Mujibur Rahman and Tajuddin Ahmed were consistently chosen the president and general secretary, individually, of the recently redid Awami League, the proposed six-point program was additionally completely embraced by the gathering meeting.
To the shame of Pakistan's decision clique, the six-point equation produced a lot of excitement among individuals of the then East Pakistan. Surely, the six-point development had right away earned unconstrained mass help all through East Pakistan. The whole country was electrifies all through February-March-April-May-June, 1966. As indicated by Dr. Talukder Maniruzzaman: "To say that this (six-point) program evoked enormous energy among individuals of East Bengal would be putting it mildly. Empowered by overpowering mainstream support, Sheik Mujib met a gathering of the AL Council (March 18-20, 1966) in which his program was collectively endorsed and he was chosen leader of the (Awami League) party. With a phalanx of coordinators from the Student's League, Sheik Mujib at that point dispatched a fiery mission. For around a quarter of a year (from mid-February to mid-May), the metropolitan places of East Bengal appeared to be in the hold of a 'mass unrest,' inciting the focal government to capture Sheik Mujib and his central lieutenants (Tajuddin Ahmed, Khandokar Mustaq Ahmed, Mansoor Ali, Zahur Ahmed Chowdhury, and others) under the (notorious) Defense of Pakistan Rules, and put down a total general strike in Dacca (June 7, 1966) by slaughtering 13 taking part strikers (Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath, UPL, 1988. P. 25)."
Rather than managing the genuine complaints of the dismissed eastern area of Pakistan, the force tip top of Pakistan took a purposeful choice to stifle the Bangalees' mission for most extreme commonplace self-governance using frontier kinds of severe techniques and strategies. Clearly, Sheik Mujibur Rahman turned into the principle focus of different destructive types of provocation, terrorizing and fake cases. The public authority heightened its strategy of suppression and mistreatment against him and his supporters. For instance, while Sheik Mujibur Rahman was visiting different locale in April 1966, he was more than once captured in practically exceedingly significant spots on shaky and fake charges.
Dr. Anisuzzaman, a recognized abstract figure of Bangladesh, has summed up the idea of the harsh measures which Sheik Mujibur Rahman needed to face and suffer for beginning and supporting the notable six-point development at a basic crossroads of our set of experiences: "During that period (from the center of February through May 9, 1966), there was not really where Sheik Mujib was not captured (on fraudulent allegations) for tending to public gatherings to enroll mass help for the six-point program. Today in Jessore, tomorrow in Khulna, day after tomorrow in Rajshahi, and on the next days in Sylhet, Mymensingh, and Chittagong. Whenever he was delivered on bail in one spot, he hurried to somewhere else. He had no an ideal opportunity to squander. The solitary time squandered was currently posting bail for his delivery. Captured once more, and being delivered on bail indeed, and afterward promptly move to somewhere else to address the public gatherings (Anisuzzaman, Bangabandhu in the Context of History, in Mreetoonjoyee Mujib- - Immortal Mujib, Dhaka; Bangabandhu Parishad, 1995, pp.11-12)." The Daily Ittefaq, the most mainstream Bangla paper of the then eastern territory of Pakistan, was closed down, its press was seized, and its manager, Tofazzal Hossain (Manik Mia), was placed in prison. However, the severe police powers couldn't end the walk of the six-point development.
In his fundamental appraisal of the job of the Awami League in the political improvement of Pakistan, Dr. M. Rashiduzzaman summed up the meaning of the six-point program: "The zenith of the Awami League interest for provincial self-governance came in March 1966 when Sheik Mujibur Rahman set forward his Six-Point Program. … The effect of the six-point interest of the Awami League was felt all over. The focal legislature (of Pakistan) named it as an interest for the partition of the Eastern wing from the remainder of the country, and dispatched a purposeful publicity crusade which required a solid focal government and discredited the autonomists. On June 7, 1966, there was an area wide hartal (strike) in East Pakistan supported by the Awami League to press the requests epitomized in the six-point program. Sheik Mujibur Rahman, alongside a few lieutenants, was again placed into jail. (Sheik Mujib was placed in prison toward the beginning of May, 1966). The public authority additionally accused 'unfamiliar interests' in the fomentation drove by the six-pointers - After about a year, a few East Pakistani government employees and military officials were captured on the charge that they had planned to isolate the East wing by rough methods in conspiracy with India. In the long run, the purported 'Agartala Conspiracy body of evidence' was started against Sheik Mujibur Rahman and 31 others for supposed high injustice.
The effect of the six-point development
The detainment of Sheik Mujibur Rahman and other top Awami Leaguers in 1966 couldn't decrease the mass help for the six-point interest, despite the fact that the force of the development could be smothered. The arrangement of concealment of all types of political opportunities and contradicting voices had pitiably neglected to end the walk of the drawn out impacts and future ramifications of the six-point development. Indeed, the numerous types of administrative suppression and the utilization of police savagery against the coordinators and members of the six-point development had persuaded everyone of the then East Pakistan to deliver their full help for the six-point recipe.
The six-point development had additionally extensive impacts on the ensuing political improvements in the then Pakistan. As indicated by Dr. M. Rashiduzzaman: "The whole weight of the gathering (the Awami League) was tossed for the counter Ayub development, which spread all through the country in the early long stretches of 1969, and almost certainly, the Awami League will assume a significantly more dynamic part later on (M. Rashiduzzaman, The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan, Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 7, July, 1970; pp. 574-587)."
Indeed, the achievement of the six-point development had incited the egotistical and spoiled Ayub Khan's authoritarian system to dishonestly involve him in the Agartala Conspiracy case. Be that as it may, an enemy of Ayub mass development in late 1968 and mid 1969 prompted the withdrawal of the supposed the case and unequivocal arrival of Sheik Mujibur Rahman.
About the effect of the six-point program on the 11-point sanction of the 1969 understudy mass development, Dr. Rashiduzzaman noticed: "Overall, the eleven-point understudy program was an extended variant of the Awami League's six-point interest for self-rule." The saliency of the six-point development in the then Pakistan legislative issues is more obvious in the accompanying closing comments of Dr. M. Rashiduzzaman: "The genuine strength of the Awami League isn't its hierarchical ability however the developing notoriety of its (Six-Point) program for local self-sufficiency with the 70 million Bengalis in East Pakistan. We have effectively noticed that a well known development began in East Pakistan following the declaration of Awami League's six-point program, and the changing example of Pakistan governmental issues has in the end prompted what is certainly a dissident development. Indeed, even the rigid harsh measures and concentrated organization can't end the cycle (of dissent). As the boss of the reason for local self-rule, the fate of the Awami League lies in its ability to maintain and fortify the development (M. Rashiduzzaman,The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan, Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 7, July, 1970; pp. 574-587)."
Dr. Talukder Maniruzzaman has noticed the prompt effect of the administrative harsh measures during the six-point development on Sheik Mujibur Rahman's fame in the accompanying words: "As one may have expected, Sheik Mujib's capture in 1966 just served to improve his fame to where he turned into the genuine image of Bengali patriotism (Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath, UPL, 1988, p. 23)." Dr. Rounaq Jahan highlighted the accompanying effects of the six-point development: "In the spring of 1966, Sheik Mujibur Rahman dispatched his now celebrated six-point development. The six-point interest - particularly alluring to the Bengali patriot bourgeoisie - was, until now, the most extreme interest for East Pakistani self-sufficiency. The six-point development evoked far reaching energy in East Pakistan. Mass gatherings and rallies held all through the territory by the East Pakistan Awami League assisted with restoring the hopeless party association and the Awami-subsidiary understudy party, the East Pakistan Student's League (EPSL). Typically, the six-point development expanded the Awami League's base of help in East Pakistan at the expense of West Pakistani help (Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration , The University Press, 1994, p.139)."
Dr. M.B. Nair closes his legitimate book, Politics in Bangladesh: A Study of Awami League:1949-58, (New Delhi, Northern Book Center, 1990, p. 257) with the accompanying perceptions about the expansive impacts of the six-point development: "Nonetheless, in 1964 when political exercises on party premise were allowed, the Awami League (AL) arose out of its disengagement and redesigned itself, so that in 1966 it (AL) had the option to give a substantial shape to its long-standing interest for provincial independence as "Six-Point Program," which consequently was the harbinger of the rise of Bangladesh as a free and sovereign state in 1971."
There were likewise more senior political forerunners in different gatherings, including Maulana Bhasani, the originator of the Awami League, who vocally requested commonplace independence for East Pakistan. Being appalled with West Pakistan's pilgrim control and abuse of East Pakistan, Maulana Bhasani had articulated more than once "farewell to West Pakistan" - at any rate 10 years sooner than the noteworthy six-point development. Truth be told, Maulana Bhasani was never able to settle on the issue of full commonplace independence for the then East Pakistan. Notwithstanding, it was Sheik Mujibur Rahman's boldness and persistence that gave a more substantial shape to the independence development in the then East Pakistan.
Concluding comments
It is likewise reasonable for propose that the six-point development was the antecedent of the accompanying earth shattering occasions: the expulsion of the notorious Provincial Governor Monem Khan, the abrupt breakdown of Ayub Khan's autocracy and the ascent of Yahya Khan's malevolent system, the General Elections in 1970 based on grown-up establishment, the avalanche triumph of the Awami League in the overall decisions, the stupendous ascent of Sheik Mujibur Rahman as the sole representative of the Bengali talking individuals of the then Pakistan, the nine-month long freedom battle in 1971 under the authority of the Awami League, lastly the rise of Bangladesh as an autonomous country state on December 16, 1971. Without a doubt, these turbulent occasions were achievements throughout the entire existence of Bangladesh's battle for opportunity and freedom, and the name of the ongoing idea that had solidly associated these achievements was Bangabandhu Sheik Mujibur Rahman.
There is no uncertainty that Sheik Mujibur Rahman would have stayed a top Awami League pioneer even without a striking common independence plan as the six-point equation. Had there been no six-point development in 1966, there is each uncertainty that the Agartala Conspiracy argument would have been brought forth against Sheik Mujib at that specific time. Had there been no Agartala Conspiracy case, the understudy mass development of 1969 might not have occurred. Consequently, the six-point development, Agartala Conspiracy case, and the 1969 understudy mass development had given the truly necessary ground and setting for the rise of Sheik Mujib as Bangabandhu (Friend of Bengal).
Accordingly, individuals of the then eastern area of Pakistan had vested their full trust in their Bangabandhu in the overall appointment of 1970, that made this exceptional man their authentic sole representative and undisputed pioneer. In fact, it was Bangabandhu Sheik Mujibur Rahman, the undisputed head of his kin, who had initiated Bangladesh's battle for all out autonomy. The circumstance, first for outlining and articulating the six-point recipe, and afterward dispatching and supporting a nationalistic development for understanding the objectives of six-point equation, was urgently significant. The monetary and political requests, as specified and counted in the noteworthy six-point recipe, were the front facing attack on the establishment of Pakistan's frontier and dictator methods of administration.